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Vom Jugendschutz zur Eigenverantwortung: Der Umgang mit dem Rau-
chen bei Jugendlichen in Westdeutschland in der Nachkriegszeit
Summary: This article draws on health education material produced on smoking in the 
1950s and 1960s in West Germany to question the extent to which smoking and health 
disappeared from the agenda in the post war decades, following the experience of anti-
smoking propaganda during the Third Reich. It suggests that continuities can be seen in 
anti-smoking literature and campaigns both before and after the Third Reich around the 
notion of youth protection. In the early 1960s, there was a more decisive break with the 
past with the foundation of the Ministry of Health and a growing determination to make 
health education a federal responsibility. There was an evident shift towards notions of 
individual responsibility and rational choice, informed by a growing body of internatio-
nal epidemiological evidence on smoking and health. There were also some attempts to 
engage with youth culture in the 1960s, rather than seeing youth culture as a threat to the 
social order, as had been the case in older youth protection arguments against smoking.
Key words: smoking – health education – public health policy – youth culture – West 
Germany – tobacco taxation
Zusammenfassung: Auf der Basis von Gesundheitsaufklärungsmaterial, das in West-
deutschland in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren zum Thema Rauchen veröffentlicht wurde, 
und vor dem Hintergrund der nationalsozialistischen Anti-Raucher-Kampagnen, stellt 
der Beitrag die Frage, in welchem Ausmaß das Thema Rauchen und Gesundheit nach 
1945 tatsächlich von der Agenda verschwunden war. Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass es im Kon-
text des Jugendgesundheitsschutzes durchaus Kontinuitäten in der Anti-Raucher-Litera-
tur und bei den Anti-Raucher-Kampagnen vor und nach dem „Dritten Reich“ gab. Erst in 
den frühen 1960er Jahren, mit der Gründung des Gesundheitsministeriums und dem zu-
nehmenden Willen, Gesundheitserziehung zu einer Aufgabe des Bundes zu machen, ist 
ein Bruch mit der Vergangenheit erkennbar. Kennzeichnend für diesen gesundheitspoli-
tischen Wandel waren die wachsende Menge internationaler epidemiologischer Daten, 
die einen Zusammenhang von Rauchen und Gesundheit zeigten, und – davon beeinfl usst 
– mehr Verantwortung des Einzelnen. Gleichzeitig gab es Versuche, sich stärker mit der 
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Jugendkultur der 1960er Jahre auseinanderzusetzen anstatt diese lediglich als Bedrohung 
der sozialen Ordnung zu sehen, wie es in der vormaligen Politik des Jugendgesundheits-
schutzes der Fall gewesen war.
Schlüsselwörter: Rauchen – Gesundheitsaufklärung – Gesundheitspolitik – Ju-
gendkultur – Westdeutschland – Tabaksteuer
Introduction
The years following 1945 saw signifi cant changes in the social and cultural 
context of smoking in what became West Germany, most notably the Westerni-
sation of smoking tastes during the occupation period. At the end of the Second 
World War, the German tobacco market all but collapsed, along with the curren-
cy, and what became West Germany was fl ooded with American and British ci-
garettes as Allied soldiers entered the country. The cigarettes became a substitute 
currency in the black market which fl ourished, and as something to smoke, for 
those who could afford them.1 American cigarettes were the most sought after 
and popular: a carton of 200 had a street value of 1000 Reichsmark before the 
currency reform.2 These cigarettes carried associations of democracy and gla-
mour, which had already been established during the war, when US cigarettes 
were seen as a luxury good.3 American cigarettes were made of Virginian tobac-
co blended with darker tobaccos, making cigarettes lighter and easier to smoke 
and to inhale than the Oriental blends traditionally preferred by German smo-
kers.4 In December 1948, as part of the Marshall Plan, German tobacco manuf-
acturers took their fi rst delivery of barrels of Virginian tobacco to ease tobacco 
shortages caused by political turmoil in Greece and the near collapse of German 
tobacco cultivation. German manufacturers began to produce their own “Ameri-
can blend“ cigarettes, mixing Virginian tobacco with available Oriental tobaccos 
to cater for this new taste.5 The post-war decades saw a growth in cigarette smo-
1 Merki, Christoph: Die Amerikanische Zigarette – Das Maß aller Dinge. In: Hengartner, Thom-
as; Merki, Christoph (eds.): Tabakfragen: Rauchen aus kulturwissenschaftlicher Sicht. Zürich 
1996, 65-68.
2 Reemtsma: Tabago: ein Bilderbuch vom Tabak und den Freuden des Rauchens. Hamburg 
1960, 117.
3 Miller, Douglas: Foreign trade and exchange controls in Germany. In: American economic 
review 33 (1943), 923-925.
4 Hercher, Richard: Tabak. In: Beckerath, Erwin von et al. (eds.): Handwörterbuch der Sozial-
wissenschaften. Stuttgart 1959, 278.
5 Doren, Gustaf Nils: Die Cigarettenanzeige im Laufe der Reemtsma Firmengeschichte. Ham-
burg 1977, 9. 
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king in West Germany, which was – by the 1960s – accompanied by increasing 
amounts of advertising focusing on lifestyle attributes and images of success and 
affl uence.6 Much of this increased consumption was of Virginian, rather than 
Oriental, cigarettes, as Germany caught up with the international trend towards 
a lighter type of tobacco.7
 This post-war growth in cigarette consumption took place in a social and po-
litical climate which has generally been seen as liberal in relation to tobacco use, 
and contrasts both to the more prohibitive era of the 1930s and early 1940s in 
Germany, and to widespread anti-smoking policies across the globe at the turn of 
the millennium.8 Comparatively liberal post-war attitudes towards tobacco use 
have been explained by historians and epidemiologists with reference to the le-
gacy of Third Reich anti-smoking propaganda, the experience of the occupation 
period where shortages led to a black market, and, in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
infl uence of the tobacco industry.9 For example, Frankenberg states that:
[t]obacco regulation in Germany underwent a dramatic change in “philosophy” after the Se-
cond World War. Whether a reaction to Nazi Germany’s rather prohibitive and racist propa-
ganda or a product of the “Camel lifestyle” that was promoted during the immediate post-war 
years, a much more liberal approach prevailed during the following three decades.10
What Frankenberg characterises as “prohibitive and racist propaganda” was 
underpinned by a growing body of scientifi c research on smoking and health 
through the 1930s and early 1940s in West Germany, which appears to have 
stalled after the end of the war.11 Proctor suggests that the post war years saw “a 
kind of backlash” against the tobacco research and anti-smoking policies which 
had been established in Germany in the 1930s, and that “popular memory of 
Nazi tobacco temperance may well have hampered the post-war German tobacco 
6 Knop, Karin: Zwischen Afri-Cola-Rausch und dem Duft der groβen weiten Welt: Werbung in 
den sechziger Jahren. In: Faulstich, Werner (ed.): Die Kultur der sechziger Jahre. München 
2003, 241-272. 
7 Merki (1996), 79.
8 Merki, Christoph: Die Nationalsozialistische Tabakpolitik. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitge-
schichte 46 (1998), 19-42; Pötschke-Langer, Martina: Recommendations of the World Health 
Organisation on tobacco control and German reality. In: Sucht 46 (2000), 434-438.
9 Frankenberg, Günther: Between paternalism and voluntarism: tobacco consumption and to-
bacco control in Germany. In: Feldman, Eric A.; Bayer, Ronald (eds.): Unfi ltered: confl icts 
over tobacco policy and public health. Cambridge, Mass. 2004, 161-189; Hess, Henner: The 
other prohibition: the cigarette crisis in post-war Germany. In: Crime, law and social change 25 
(1996), 43-62; Gilmore, Anna; Nolte, Ellen; McKee, Martin; Collin, Jeff: Continuing infl uence 
of tobacco industry in Germany. In: The Lancet 360 (2002), 1255.
10 Frankenberg (2004), 171.
11 Proctor, Robert N.: The Nazi war on tobacco: ideology, evidence, and public health conse-
quences. In: Bulletin of the history of medicine 71 (1997), 435-488.
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movement”.12 More recently, Bachinger et al. have shown the tensions within 
anti-smoking policy in the Third Reich, particularly after 1941,13 while Merki 
has argued that, by 1943, senior Nazi offi cials were describing anti-smoking 
policies as “redundant” – not because everyone had given up smoking, but be-
cause there was very little available and affordable tobacco for ordinary people 
to smoke anyway.14 Nonetheless, Merki also suggests that health, in relation to 
smoking, disappeared from the political agenda in the immediate post-war ye-
ars.15 This uncertainty as to the signifi cance of Third Reich anti-smoking propa-
ganda for developments in the post-war years opens the question of continuity 
and change in attitudes towards tobacco smoking across the middle of the 20th 
century in Germany.
 In the post-war period, research on smoking and health was taken up prima-
rily by the Anglo-American scientifi c community, who began to gather epide-
miological and biological data showing a causal connection between smoking 
and lung cancer, as well as other chronic conditions.16 The extent to which epi-
demiologists working in the late 1940s and early 1950s in Britain were aware 
of research on smoking and lung cancer carried out by epidemiologists working 
in Germany in the 1930s is uncertain.17 By the late 1950s, the Medical Research 
Council (hereafter MRC) in Britain was attempting to bring knowledge on smo-
king and health to greater awareness, with the Royal College of Physicians (he-
reafter RCP) producing a landmark report in 1962.18 Both the report of the MRC, 
published in 1957, and that of the RCP, were, as this paper will show, infl uential 
in bringing the topic of smoking and health back onto the political agenda in 
West Germany.
 However, it is also possible to argue that the question of smoking and health 
never really disappeared in West Germany in the post-war years. This paper will 
suggest that concern about the health effects of smoking was intricately tied 
with issues of tobacco taxation and the recovery of the domestic tobacco market 
following the infl ux of Virginian cigarettes on to the black market post-1945 and 
the changing tastes of West German smokers. Debates about the health risks of 
12 Proctor, Robert N.: The Nazi war on cancer. Princeton 1999, 226-227.
13 Bachinger Eleonore; McKee, Martin; Gilmore Anna: Tobacco policies in Nazi Germany: not 
as simple as it seems. In: Public Health 122 (2008), 497-505.
14 Merki (1998), 39. 
15 Merki (1996), 81.
16 Berridge, Virginia: Marketing health: smoking and the discourse of public health in Britain, 
1945-2000. Oxford 2007, 23-25.
17 Elliot, Rosemary: “Stunde Null”? A comparison of British and West German responses to the 
epidemiological case against smoking in the 1950s. In: Rokkansenteret Report 2 (2007), 121-
132. 
18 Berridge (2007), 44-51. 
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smoking, particularly for young people, surface within this context at a federal 
level. The government sought to balance fi scal necessity with public health, lea-
ving the responsibility for health education of young people in the hands of the 
Länder, voluntary organisations and private bodies, as had been the case prior to 
the Nazi regime. It is possible to see continuities in the institutions and personnel 
promoting an anti-smoking message through the 1950s and, to a certain extent, 
in the message being promoted, although references to racial hygiene and mili-
tary preparedness are absent in the post-war years, as one might expect.
 Nonetheless, health education material produced in the 1950s also suggests 
that anti-smoking sentiment was infl uenced by the social and cultural context 
of that decade. In texts, speeches and discussion about youth smoking, fears 
about the effect of Americanisation and mass consumption sat alongside con-
cerns about social dislocation and its effect on young people. There was a feeling 
that young people had not been complicit in creating the problematic social and 
economic circumstances which were thought to be causing increased smoking, 
and thus, should be protected from consequent harm. This material shows the 
adjustments and tensions within West German society as it struggled to come to 
terms with the legacy of the Third Reich, the Second World War and the occupa-
tion period.
 The emphasis on young people was only one aspect of post-war health educa-
tion on smoking, but it was the largest, the most emotive and the most enduring. 
Analysis of health education aimed at youth shows a shift in emphasis from 
youth protection arguments in the early 1950s towards an approach grounded 
in international epidemiological evidence on smoking and health and a focus 
on individual responsibility for health by the 1960s. This can be linked to the 
establishment of the Federal Ministry of Health (Bundesministerium für Gesund-
heitswesen) in 1961, as a result of which the issue of smoking and health came 
back onto the political agenda at a federal level. The reappearance of smoking as 
a political issue was largely motivated by the need to respond to concerns raised 
about smoking by Anglo-American epidemiological and biomedical research on 
smoking and health. These fears were most prominently publicised in the alrea-
dy-mentioned RCP report of 1962, but also in the 1964 U.S. Surgeon General’s 
report on smoking and health.19 Again, the West German response focused on 
young people, but a crucial difference by this point was the explicit desire to in-
19 Smoking and health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public 
Health Service. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1964. 
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form health education aimed at young people through up-to-date expert scientifi c 
and pedagogical knowledge.
 One further point to consider is what is meant by youth in relation to smo-
king. In large part, in the original literature, the young smoker was conceptua-
lised as male, which refl ects the gender balance of smoking in the fi rst half of 
the 20th century and well into the second. However, women were targeted by 
cigarette advertising from the early 20th century,20 and there were specifi c health 
fears related to female smoking, not least the impact of nicotine on women’s 
reproductive health and on the developing foetus.21 These fears continued to be 
voiced in relation to female smoking, cigarette smoking in particular, in West 
Germany through the 1950s and 1960s, at a time when, in other countries such as 
Britain, concerns about smoking focused almost exclusively on men. This focus 
on men was a product of the fact that Anglo-American epidemiological evidence 
fi rstly focused on smoking and lung cancer, then heart problems, and looked 
predominantly at sample populations of men, with studies of maternal smoking 
and foetal health not emerging until the early 1960s.22 In Germany, the trajectory 
of research into smoking and reproductive and foetal health was different. From 
early 20th century concerns about the effects of smoking on women’s reproduc-
tive systems through to research on smoking, health and fertility among women 
carried out in the early 1940s, health concerns about smoking among women of 
reproductive age assumed a much more central position.23
 The paper draws on archival material from the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz from 
1941 through to 1970 to illuminate action on smoking and health at a ministe-
rial level and also at the interface between the federal government and the Län-
der. This is important given that health education was primarily a matter for the 
Länder governments.24 The paper also draws on documents from the Deutsche 
Gesundheitsmuseum, also located within the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, which the 
Ministry of Health took over full fi nancial support of in 1964, and which became 
the Federal Centre for Health Education (Bundeszentrale für Gesundheitliche 
20 Kosta, Barbara: Cigarettes, Advertising and the Weimar Republic’s modern woman. In: Finney, 
Gail (ed.): Visual culture in twentieth century Germany: text as spectacle. Bloomington, India-
napolis 2006, 134-153.
21 Enke, Martina C.: Über die Bedeutung des Tabaks in der europäischen Medizin vom 16. bis ins 
20. Jahrhundert. Berlin 1998, 405-406.
22 Elliot, Rosemary: Smoking among women, 1890-2000. New York 2007, 146-147.
23 Enke (1998), 405-406; Zimmermann, Susanne; Egger, Matthias; Hossfeld, Uwe: Commen-
tary: Pioneering research into smoking and health in Nazi Germany – the “Wissenschaftliches 
Institut zur Erforschung der Tabakgefahren” in Jena. In: International journal of epidemiology 
30 (2001), 35–37.
24 Lindner, Ulrike: Chronische Gesundheitsprobleme: das deutsche Gesundheitssystem vom Kai-
serreich bis in die Bundesrepublik. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 33/34 (2003), 21-28.
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Aufklärung) in 1967. Campaigns on smoking and health have been explored at a 
Land level in Hamburg (from 1941) and Baden-Württemberg (from 1915). These 
states were selected because of the presence of the tobacco industry in Hamburg 
and because Baden-Württemberg was instrumental in providing the fi nance for 
the second health education brochure discussed in this paper in the mid-1960s. 
The paper also draws on materials dating from 1919 from the library of the 
Deutsche Hauptstelle für Suchtfragen and on the papers of Phillip F. Reemtsma 
(1893-1959) from 1918 at the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung. There is 
also reference to material from the archives of the Deutsche Hygiene Museum, 
Dresden for the post-war period.25
Smoking and youth from Imperial Germany to 1945
Historians such as Proctor and Merki have amply shown that anti-smoking sen-
timents and medical research about the negative health effects of smoking was 
evident in Germany from the early 20th century onwards and came to fruition 
during the Third Reich.26 Less discussed, however, is the extent to which young 
people, as both perceived victims of tobacco smoking and as the most legitimate 
target of anti-smoking propaganda, played a central role in arguments about to-
bacco policy from the early 20th century onwards. Youth protection provided a 
justifi cation for certain anti-smoking measures from the First World War on-
wards, and a means for anti-smoking and abstinence organisations to bring the 
issue of smoking and health onto the Nazi agenda. It is within the context of 
youth protection that continuities after 1945 can be seen.
 The main force against smoking in the early 20th century was the German An-
ti-Tobacco League (Bund Deutscher Tabakgegner) established in 1910,27 which 
continued its existence after the Second World War. From its inception, the Ger-
man Anti-Tobacco League sought legislative measures including prohibition of 
smoking among under-16s and restrictions on the sale of smoking goods to this 
group.28 The League had international parallels in the Anglo-American context, 
where campaigns to protect young people from smoking date back to the late 
25 I am extremely grateful for the help given to me by the archivists and librarians at these organi-
sations. 
26 Merki (1998); Proctor (1997). 
27 Kurze Geschichte des Bundes Deutscher Tabakgegner. In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (January 
1919), 4. There had been tobacco abstinence organisations prior to the founding of the German 
Anti-Tobacco League, thus the League was part of an established tradition.
28 Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (hereafter Stuttgart) E151/52 
Bü 15, Satzungen des Bundes Deutsche Tabakgegner, undated, fi led with material from First 
World War. 
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19th century and have been well-documented.29 Such campaigns fi tted into other 
social movements such as Temperance reform, the drive for “national effi ciency” 
and broader concerns about the health of the population in the wake of industri-
alisation.30 The movement against cigarette smoking in Germany was less well 
developed than that in the United States or Britain, arguably because cigarette 
smoking (which was seen as the prime problem) was itself less established in the 
population.31
 The German Anti-Tobacco League was a small organisation: by 1919, their 
membership was only 458 annual subscribers.32 Nonetheless, they were success-
ful in the First World War in petitioning the government for a prohibition on 
smoking among young people, citing not only damage to internal organs, but 
damage to the “next generation” (heranwachsende Geschlecht).33 Their argu-
ments showed a mixture of moral concerns, military ideals and nationalism, and 
were clearly aimed at young men.34 Their proposal was supported by the Reich 
Ministry of the Interior (Reichsministerium des Innern) who wrote to the Länder 
about the issue, citing other worrying behaviours including visiting cinemas, 
pubs and cafes, smoking cigarettes, reading trash (Schund) literature, and han-
ging about at night. Such behaviours were believed to exemplify a lack of disci-
pline among young people. This was, the Ministry believed, due to the lack of a 
paternal infl uence, as many fathers and teachers were being conscripted into the 
army.35 These opinions refl ected concerns that war-time conditions were under-
mining the social order, but also fears about youth and morality.36 Action against 
smoking among young people was also supported by the military authorities, 
who saw such policies within the context of preparing young men for military 
service.37
29 Tate, Cassandra: Cigarette wars: The triumph of the little white slaver. New York, Oxford 
1999; Duis, Perry R.: Cigarettes and sin: Lucy Page Gaston led a children’s crusade against the 
evils of the weed. Chicago 1983, 142-145; Hilton, Matthew: “Tabs”, “fags” and the “boy la-
bour problem” in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain. In: Journal of social history 28 (1995), 
587-607.
30 Elliot (2007), 43-44.
31 Jacobs, Tino: Rauch und Macht: das Unternehmen Reemtsma 1920-1960. Göttingen 2008, 30.
32 Deutscher Tabakgegner 3 (May 1919).
33 Stuttgart M77/1 Bü 1111, Die Reichskanzlei an die Bundesregierungen, 12 June 1916. 
34 Was sollte die Jugend vom Tabak wissen? Bund Deutscher Tabakgegner, 1919. 
35 Stuttgart M77/1 Bü 1111, Bekanntmachung des Ministeriums des Innern, betreffend die Erzie-
hung der Jugend während des Krieges, 24 November 1915.
36 Dickinson, Edward R.: The politics of German child welfare from the Empire to the Federal 
Republic. Cambridge, Mass., London 1996, 116.
37 Stuttgart M77/1 Bü 1111, Stellv. Generalkommando XIII Armeekorps an den Herrn Kriegsmin-
ister, 17 August 1916. 
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 Measures against smoking did not last beyond the end of the war, because of 
an inability to effectively police any prohibition during the war.38 Nonetheless, 
prohibition of smoking among youth remained a recurring theme in interwar 
debates on the state of youth culture and concerns about the drift of young peo-
ple into waywardness.39 The German Anti-Tobacco League argued, for example, 
that the “brutalisation” of young people had not diminished since the end of the 
war, blaming the infl uence of cinema and the illegal import of American cigaret-
tes, an argument which tapped into wider fears about the negative infl uence of 
mass culture.40 Such concerns arose in the broader context of the Schmutz und 
Schund (trash and dirt) campaign, which enjoyed some success.41 Arguments 
about smoking were aimed at young men primarily, with female smokers seen 
to be a minority. Young women were addressed separately, with appeals to eco-
nomy and thrift – refl ecting the fi nancial turbulence of the Weimar period. One 
interwar publication noted the heavy fi nancial cost of smoking, to both family 
and population. Women and girls were urged not to imitate the “stronger sex” by 
taking up smoking, but to use their “natural infl uence in the family” to persuade 
husbands, sons and other male relatives and friends to give up their “enslave-
ment” to nicotine.42
 In much of the writing of this period, as Proctor has shown, nicotine was seen 
as the problematic component of tobacco.43 Nicotine was recognised as addic-
tive, characterised as a “poison” and seen to damage heart and circulation, with 
children at particular risk.44 This was often linked into arguments about the na-
ture of heredity infl uential in the early 20th century, with smoking, like alcohol, 
constructed as damaging not only to reproduction at an individual level, but to 
the Volk as a whole. This conceptualisation extended arguments about the suscep-
tibility of children to the whole population. The Baltic-German physiological 
chemist, Gustav von Bunge, wrote “one forgets that the youngest and most sen-
sitive organism is the germ cell (Keimzelle). […] Therefore, we need to question 
whether regular smoking among adults also damages the germ cell. Looking at 
38 Stuttgart M77/1 Bü 1111, Königl. Württ. Ministerium des Innern an das K. Stellv. Gener-
alkommando XIII (K.W.) Armeekorps, 30 November 1917. 
39 Dickinson (1996), 149.
40 Die Jugend wacht auf! In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (November 1919), No. 6, 55. 
41 Stieg, Margaret: The 1926 German law to protect youth against trash and dirt: moral protec-
tionism in a democracy. In: Central European history 23 (1990), 22-56.
42 Stuttgart E151/52 Bü 15, “Aufruf an die deutschen Frauen und Mädchen”, Bund Deutscher 
Tabakgegner. This is undated, but archived with material from the early 1920s.
43 Proctor (1997), 448.
44 Petri, W.: Zur Beurteilung des Nicotingehaltes der Tabake. In: Zeitschrift für Lebensmittelun-
tersuchung und Forschung 60 (1930), 123-142.
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chronic alcoholism would suggest that it [nicotine consumption] does.”45 Calls to 
restrict smoking among young people found favour in legislative terms with the 
sale of goods containing nicotine to under 16s becoming an offense in 1927. In 
1933, almost as soon as the National Socialist regime took over, the German Anti-
Tobacco League (which had renamed itself the Deutscher Bund zur Bekämpfung 
der Tabakgefahren) petitioned for legislation to be extended to prohibit tobac-
co use among under-18s.46 This was partially achieved in March 1940, with the 
passing of a law to forbid those under 18 smoking in public, although this was 
justifi ed as a war-time measure, and replicated the situation in World War One.47
 While the German Anti-Tobacco League maintained its status as an indepen-
dent organisation through the Third Reich, members of the League saw the rise 
of the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) as an opportunity to promote their cau-
se. In 1931, the directorship of the League had been taken over by Fritz Lickint 
(1898-1960), a prominent tobacco researcher and one of Germany’s foremost 
critics of tobacco use.48 Lickint was also concerned with the consequences of 
alcohol misuse, which shows the way both issues were interlinked.49 Lickint 
substantially increased the size of the League’s journal and re-organised it. In an 
editorial in 1933, under a picture of Adolf Hitler, the editorial proclaimed:
The Führer of our new state lives free from tobacco. All opponents of tobacco will realise this 
with sincere pleasure. It is also the fi rst time that a German Chancellor of the Reich is a non-
smoker and can make decisions over the fate of our Volk uninfl uenced by nicotine and other 
social drugs [Genußgifte]. With this, we can hope for the fi rst time, that our voice will be heard 
in government, after years and decades in which it has been practically impossible to even get 
a cautionary article into the daily press […].
No wonder we have not yet succeeded in making the population aware of such important requi-
rements as a tobacco-free upbringing and education for children and young people.
Now fi nally the time has come for us to arrive on the scene! The fi rst step should be a prohibi-
tion of smoking among young people.50
The editorial referred to acceptance among the medical profession for restric-
tions and education on youth smoking on health grounds. Adults who smoked 
45 Stuttgart, E151/52 Bü 15, Bunge, G. von: Die Tabakvergiftung. Bund Deutscher Tabakgegner, 
undated, archived with material from the 1920s.
46 Rundschreiben. In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (1933), No. 2/3, 18.
47 Polizeiverordnung zum Schutz der Jugend vom 9. März 1940, Reichsgesetzblatt I, 499. For 
further details, see Lewy, Jonathan: A sober Reich? Alcohol and tobacco use in Nazi Germany. 
In: Substance use and misuse 41 (2006), 1189-1190.
48 Deutscher Tabakgegner (1931), No. 6, 37-38; Haustein, Knut-Olaf: Fritz Lickint (1898-1960) 
– Ein Leben als Aufklärer über die Gefahren des Tabaks. In: Suchtmed 6 (2004), 249-255; 
Proctor (1999), 183-186.
49 Haustein (2004), 249.
50 Wir Tabakgegner und das neue Reich. In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (1933), No. 2/3, 18.
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were seen to be beyond redemption (“not many adults can be cured of their ad-
diction”). Lickint justifi ed the emphasis on youth as a means of ensuring young 
people achieved their highest physical and intellectual potential, and also with 
reference to “the need to create an undamaged, free, new Germany from the 
embryo upwards”. Lickint drew on contemporary understandings of hereditary 
biology to make his point, stressing that “[i]t must be our aim for the future to 
reproduce our German Volk not only in the context of a pure race but with refe-
rence to the hygiene of the germ cell (Keimhygiene)”.51
 The language of hereditary biology augmented arguments about the need for 
abstinence from smoking apparent in previous decades. Youth smoking was also 
seen as a response to the social and economic climate of the early 1930s. Lickint, 
who was a member of the SPD at the time, cited the “distress” and unemploy-
ment facing a high number of young people as a result of economic conditions 
as a factor which contributed to youth smoking, a reference to the effects of the 
Great Depression on Germany in the early 1930s.52
 For the National Socialist party, in the mid-1930s, anti-smoking sentiments 
arguably came second to concerns about alcoholism. The 1933 Sterilisation Laws 
permitted alcoholics to be sterilised, a fate which did not befall smokers, despite 
expressed concerns about the hereditary effects of tobacco consumption. This 
was possibly because excessive smoking did not lead to the same outward appea-
rance of insobriety and was more socially acceptable. In 1934, the umbrella orga-
nisation for anti-alcohol groups, the German Reich Agency against Alcoholism 
(Deutsche Reichshauptstelle gegen den Alkoholismus) gave up its independence 
to become part of the NSDAP health offi ce, becoming the Reich Agency against 
the Misuse of Alcohol (Reichsstelle gegen den Alkoholmiβbrauch). In 1939, it 
merged with the Reich Working Group for Combating Drugs (Reicharbeitsge-
meinschaft für Rauschgiftbekämpfung), which was a section within the Reich 
Ministry of the Interior, to create the Reich Agency against the Dangers of Al-
cohol and Tobacco (Reichsstelle gegen die Alkohol- und Tabakgefahren), under 
the leadership of the Reich Health Führer (Reichsgesundheitsführer), Leonardo 
Conti. The aim was to align the aims of state and party.53 The German Anti-
51 Lickint, Fritz: Tabak und gesunde Jugenderziehung. In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (1933), No. 2, 
21. 
52 Rundschreiben. In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (1933), No. 2/3, 18.
53 Arbeitsbericht 1939/40, Reichsstelle gegen die Alkohol- und Tabakgefahren, Berlin-Dahlem 
1940, 1; Stuttgart, E151/09 Bü 335. The “Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren” 
gives a slightly different account of its history in 1951, stating that the German Reich Agency 
Against Alcoholism merged with the Reich Working Group for Combating Drugs in 1934: Die 
Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren: Ziele, Aufgaben, Organisation. Hamm 1951. 
I have opted to go with the account given in the German Reich Agency Against Alcoholism’s 
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Tobacco League worked closely with the Reich Agency against the Dangers of 
Alcohol and Tobacco although it maintained its independence.54
 Tobacco came to the fore as a concern for the National Socialists relatively 
late in the 1930s, despite the hopes of the German Anti-Tobacco League in 1933. 
The impetus came from medical evidence emerging in Germany in the late 1930s. 
Lickint published his book on smoking and health, Tabak und Organismus, in 
1939, the same year as Franz Müller published one of the earliest epidemiolo-
gical studies making the association between smoking and lung cancer.55 This 
and other subsequent research allowed the Reich Agency against the Dangers of 
Alcohol and Tobacco to make the argument that tobacco, as alcohol, presented 
a threat to the medical and moral health of the Volk, the Volk being constructed 
in racial terms.56 This developed nationalist and public health arguments already 
present in earlier decades, but fi tted within a more prominently racial hygiene 
agenda, as Proctor and Merki have shown.57
 However, it is notable that the fi rst annual report of the Reich Agency against 
the Dangers of Alcohol and Tobacco stated that the purpose of the organisation 
was to concentrate on youth, pointing out that it was up to adults whether to 
smoke moderately or abstain.58 The Agency listed 12 aims, of which preventing 
young people from smoking was the fi rst.59 The focus on youth smoking re-
mained generally accepted even when anti-smoking policy became contentious 
in the early 1940s. As the tobacco industry and the Reich Tobacco Offi ce suc-
cessfully argued that tobacco was essential to the war effort, the Reich Ministry 
of Propaganda sought to limit the extent and content of anti-smoking sentiment.60 
Correspondence within the Reich Ministry of Propaganda expressed the belief 
that the only possible way of addressing smoking was to address young people 
report of 1940, as this was published very soon after the merger had taken place. The merge 
was also reported in the medical press. 
54 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1249, News cutting from Ärzteblatt für Norddeutschland, issue 
16, 6 August 1939. 
55 Müller, Franz: Tabakmissbrauch und Lungencarcinom. In: Zeitschrift für Krebsforschung 49 
(1939), 57-85. This is discussed in more detail in Proctor (1999), 195-196.
56 Bericht der II. Reichstagung “Volksgesundheit und Genußgifte”, Reichsstelle gegen den Alko-
holmißbrauch, Berlin-Dahlem 1939; Stuttgart, E151/09 Bü 335. 
57 Merki (1998); Proctor (1997).
58 Arbeitsbericht 1939/40, Reichsstelle gegen die Alkohol- und Tabakgefahren, Berlin-Dahlem 
1940, 2. 
59 Bericht der II. Reichstagung “Volksgesundheit und Genußgifte”, Reichsstelle gegen den Alko-
holmißbrauch, Berlin-Dahlem 1939, 3; Stuttgart, E151/09 Bü 335.
60 Various papers at the Hamburger Institute für Sozialforschung, hereafter HIS (PFR 480/01 – 03) 
and BA NS 18/226, including HIS PFR 480 – 02 Abschrift, Walter Funk, Reichwirtschaftsmin-
ister an den Stellvertreter des Führers, 5 May 1941; BA NS 18/226 Vorlage, 12 May 1941. For 
a fuller discussion, see Bachinger, McKee and Gilmore (2008), 497-505. 
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and prevent them from taking the habit up. 61 Within a more restricted anti-smo-
king policy, campaigns addressed to young people were to be centrally agreed 
and carried out through the Reich Youth Leadership (Reichsjugendführung).62
 Literature on smoking addressing young people was produced for the Hit-
ler Youth (Hitlerjugend) and by the Reich Health Offi ce (Reichgesundheitsamt). 
The emphasis on young men’s health was constructed in militaristic terms, and 
heavily infl uenced by the ideology of the regime.63 In contrast, publications from 
the Reich Health Offi ce emphasise the physiological effects of smoking, high-
lighting the effect of nicotine on the heart and the circulation. Here too, young 
people were seen to be at particular risk as growing bodies were not thought to be 
able to tolerate nicotine. There were also ideological concerns: that smoking and 
drinking did not “fi t” with young German men, because of the perceived effects 
on courage and capability Young women were urged to consider the effect of 
smoking on their future marital fertility.64 This fi tted within the broader pronata-
list agenda of the Nazi regime.
 Looking at the decades prior to 1945, a number of themes emerge. Young bo-
dies were seen to be at greater risk from nicotine, albeit in gendered terms. The 
smoker was seen as male, with women in the early decades of the 20th century 
being seen as the moral arbiter, and asked to exert infl uence over male family 
members and friends to give up smoking. Smoking among young men was seen 
to exemplify a lack of parental, particularly paternal, infl uence and to be a result 
of mass culture. There were also strong links between concerns about alcohol 
and tobacco use. Anxieties about smoking and young people were also used as a 
platform to address established adult smokers. These themes were to re-appear 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
A changing context: smoking and youth protection in post-war Germany
As outlined in the introduction, tobacco fi lled both a cultural and an economic 
position in the occupation period, as a symbol of Westernisation and as source 
of revenue. The Allied authorities raised tobacco taxes substantially in 1946 to 
contribute to the costs of the occupation.65 This rise caused outrage amongst Ger-
61 BA NS 18/226, Braeckow at Ministry of Propaganda, to Goebbels, 24 May 1941. 
62 BA NS 18/226, Ministry of Propaganda to Deutsche Bund zur Bekämpfung der Tabakge-
fahren, 27 June 1941. 
63 “Du hast die Pfl icht, gesund zu sein!” Gesundheitsaktion der Hitler-Jugend (Reichsjugendfüh-
rung, undated). This was viewed at the Deutsche Hauptstelle für Suchtfragen.
64 Goebel, Ferdinand: Warum rauchst Du? Berlin-Dahlem 1941, 10. This was viewed at the 
Deutsche Hauptstelle für Suchtfragen.
65 BA B102/73559, Alliierte Kontrollbehörde, Kontrollrat Nr. 26, ‘Tabaksteuer’.
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man tobacco producers, who believed this was a factor in the continuing black 
market and smuggling problem and as such, undermined the domestic tobacco 
industry.66 Whilst this tax increase was partly rescinded in 1948, West German 
tobacco producers immediately began to lobby the new Bonn government in 
1949 for a further reduction in tobacco taxes to allow them to make their pro-
ducts competitive and to protect their livelihood.67
 These debates provided a starting point for revived anti-smoking concern af-
ter the war. The German Agency against the Dangers of Addiction (Deutsche 
Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, hereafter DHS), founded in 1947, opposed 
any reduction in tobacco taxes on health grounds, arguing that the increased to-
bacco consumption they believed would result from reduced tobacco taxes con-
tradicted all the principles of population health and nutrition. At a time when the 
authorities were fi ghting to tackle tuberculosis, the DHS asked, why they were 
forgetting the “epidemics” caused by alcohol and tobacco use.68 The DHS stood 
as the common voice of welfare and abstinence groups in West Germany after 
the war. It was established as the successor to the Reich Agency against the Dan-
gers of Alcohol and Tobacco, which had ceased to exist at the end of the war. The 
DHS aimed to provide guidelines and information on matter such as alcoholism, 
smoking and other addictions as well sexually transmitted diseases. There were 
numerous member organisations of the DHS, including welfare organisations 
such as the Caritas Verband, Innere Mission, the Arbeiterwohlfahrt alongside 
abstinence organisations such as the International Guttempler Organisation and 
the Deutscher Bund zur Bekämpfung der Tabakgefahren.69 The DHS aimed “to 
fi ght addictions with all the measures not available to its member organisations”. 
In practice this meant it provided an information digest of the situation relating 
to addictions in the fi rst instance, called Infodienst, and by the early 1950s, a 
monthly newsletter (Ruf ins Volk), a scientifi c journal, and pamphlets dedicated 
to specifi c health issues. Regional branches (Landesstellen) were set up, often on 
meagre budgets from charitable organisations, to liaise with the authorities of the 
66 BA B102/11001, Arbeitgemeinschaft der Zigarrenherstellerverbände des Britischen und 
amerikanischen Besatzungsgebiets, Denkschrift, November 1949. Complaints initially came 
from cigar manufacturers, with the issue subsequently being picked up by cigarette manufac-
turers.
67 BA B102/73557, “Skizze” sent by Philip Reemtsma to Bundeswirtschaftsminister, 5 January 
1950.
68 Infodienst der Deutschen Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren (hereafter Infodienst), July 
1948, 2.
69 Die Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren: Ziele, Aufgaben, Organisation. Hamm 
1951, 3-4.
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Länder and welfare organisations at a more local level.70 This refl ected the fact 
that the responsibility for public health was dealt with at the level of the Länder.
 In addition to criticising proposed reductions in tobacco taxation, the DHS 
also spoke out in 1948 against the increased import of tobacco, set up through the 
Marshall Plan, arguing that this would lead to substantial health damage among 
the German people. They argued that shipping space and dollars would be better 
used on nutritious foods.71 In addition to health damage, the DHS argued that 
increased tobacco consumption caused emotional and moral damage to the Volk, 
connecting increased smoking and drinking to higher levels of criminality, sexu-
ally transmitted diseases and family problems.72 It is not immediately clear what 
kind of family problems were meant here, but other articles focusing on the need 
for youth protection refer to “soft” or “weak” parenting, lax morals and the need 
to awaken a sense of responsibility among parents.73
 In 1949, the DHS began a youth protection campaign, in conjunction with 
the Landesstellen, addressing a wide range of issues including smoking.74 Here, 
concerns about secondary poverty were also apparent, as the DHS provided sta-
tistics on the proportion of national and domestic income spent on alcohol and 
tobacco.75 In short, the DHS believed that reducing tobacco consumption was 
benefi cial for the “morality and health of the Volk”, particularly young people.76 
Similar arguments were made about alcohol. The DHS also criticised measures 
to allow women under 25 tobacco rations – a group which had not been allocated 
tobacco under the National Socialists. Here, the arguments related to the “deli-
cate organism” of the young woman which would be particularly damaged by 
tobacco.77 This concern about young women and the broader medical and moral 
concerns about the health of the population can be seen as a product of the way 
in which smoking had been seen through previous decades.
 From 1950, the DHS lobbied politicians to try to prevent the proposed cuts in 
tobacco taxes, sending a letter to all members of the Bundestag in 1951 and again 
in 1952. Price was seen as one of the main barriers to increased youth smoking 
and the DHS argued that the health of the population, particularly that of young 
70 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1251, Bericht über die Zusammenkunft einer zu gründenden 
Landesstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, 12 April 1949; Infodienst, 1949, No. 3, 1-2.
71 Infodienst, July 1948, 1.
72 Infodienst, July 1948, 2.
73 Infodienst, April 1948, 1.
74 Infodienst 1949, No. 3, 1. Other issues included campaigning to stop the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases, campaigns against “Schmutz und Schund” and promoting abstinence 
from alcohol. 
75 See for example, Infodienst 1954/55, No. 2, 1.
76 Infodienst, July 1948, 1-3.
77 Infodienst, July 1948, 1.
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people, would be endangered if tobacco taxes were reduced.78 The DHS also 
sought support from its branches and offi cials in the Länder, urging them to peti-
tion members of the Bundestag about the issue.79 A number of public health pro-
fessionals and youth workers also wrote to the federal authorities condemning 
the tobacco tax cuts.80 The concern which united such groups was that reduced 
tobacco taxes would lead to increased tobacco consumption, a point which the 
tobacco industry also accepted, and indeed desired. In 1953, the DHS drew on 
tobacco industry fi gures to suggest that the proposed reduction in tobacco taxes 
would lead to a monthly increase in smoking of one thousand million cigarettes 
nationally.81 The fear was that this increased tobacco consumption would impact 
most strongly on the health of young people.82
 The arguments made by the DHS in its 1950s material contain a mixture 
of scientifi c evidence emerging from the United States and Great Britain and 
concerns arising from post-war cultural change. These sat alongside older youth 
protection and pronatalist arguments. The DHS accepted that smoking contribut-
ed to lung cancer, although in common with the Anglo-American scientifi c com-
munity, the DHS focused on the lung cancer risk to men, using stark diagrams 
to show the correlation between increased smoking and higher lung cancer mor-
tality. This correlation was a result of the higher proportion of male smokers in 
previous decades and the fact that post-war epidemiological research focused on 
this group.83 Epidemiological concerns were augmented by cultural change and 
the impact of occupation, which had resulted in the Americanisation of smoking 
tastes, as the population shifted from cigars to cigarettes, and from Oriental to 
Virginian cigarettes. This trend towards cigarette smoking was seen to be parti-
cularly damaging to health as cigarette smokers were more likely to inhale, and 
Virginian tobacco was seen as more addictive.84 The link between smoking and 
78 BA B102 73557, Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren to Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft, 5 June 1951; Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren to members of the 
Bundestag, 8 September 1952; BA B102/73558, Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtge-
fahren to members of the Bundestag, March 1953.
79 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1248, circular letter, Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtge-
fahren, 13 September 1952.
80 BA B102/73558, see for example, Ernst Gass to Bundeswirtschaftsminister Erhard, 30 August 
1952. 
81 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1248, open letter, Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtge-
fahren, 31 March 1953.
82 BA B102/73558, Kein Steuergesetz zum Schaden der Volksgesundheit und der Jugend. In: Ruf 
ins Volk: Monatschrift für Volksgesundung und Jugendschutz (September 1952), 4.
83 BA B102/73558‚ Rauchen fördert Lungenkrebs. In: Ruf ins Volk: Monatschrift für Volksge-
sundung und Jugendschutz (September 1952), 2. 
84 BA B102/73557, “Keine kurzsichtige Steuerpolitik”, enclosed in letter from Deutsche Haupt-
stelle gegen die Suchtgefahren to Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 5 June 1951. 
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crime was also made: the director of a youth prison argued that cigarettes lured 
allegedly young people into crime, as they either stole cigarettes, or used the 
proceeds of theft to buy them.85
 These arguments were also cited in the parliamentary debates surrounding the 
bill on tobacco taxation in 1953.86 The Finance Minister agreed to put forward 
money for the health education of young people on smoking, which would, in 
his view, offset the danger from reduced tobacco taxes. This funding was to be 
given to existing non-government health and welfare organisations, not state-led 
measures.87 Thus, the new Bonn government acknowledged and responded to 
concerns about the potential for increased smoking caused by reducing taxation, 
but did so in such a way as to distance themselves from the propaganda and re-
strictions of the Nazi regime. As one supporter of the bill put it,
One can only treat emotional illnesses like drug addiction adequately by treating the 
soul, but never through police orders, tax law and with all the methods of a past dic-
tatorship, which we want to know nothing about. Only education is successful here. 
Those who are concerned about drug addiction will concern themselves with it.88
This was the only reference to National Socialist anti-smoking policy and it is 
clear that it was one element in a much wider debate as the government sought 
to balance the needs of the domestic tobacco industry and the desire for revenue 
with public health.
 Through the 1950s, health education material was produced by non-govern-
ment organisations, such as the DHS, albeit with some fi nancial backing. These 
were the same organisations that had been active during previous decades, thus 
– in many ways – simply reverting to the situation that had existed prior to the 
Third Reich. These organisations were keen to move on from their past whilst 
acknowledging its effects. In a conference focusing on youth protection in 1953, 
organised by the DHS, the opening speaker noted the terrible years behind them, 
their generation’s guilt for this and the burden which the coming generation had 
to carry, which was, he believed, expressed through increased drinking, smoking 
and emotional and spiritual turmoil. He argued that this could be made good by 
advice and practical measures to help the welfare of young people. He continued,
If one wants to promote preventive health measures, one has to work on promoting an alcohol 
and tobacco free upbringing. We all know the great emotional and spiritual distress on the part 
85 Weber: Zigarette – Ursache krimineller Entgleisungen von Jugendlichen. In: Ruf ins Volk 
(September 1952), 2. 
86 Deutscher Bundestag, 257. Sitzung, 25 March 1953; Deutscher Bundestag, 259. Sitzung, 15 
April 1953.
87 Deutscher Bundestag, 257. Sitzung, 25 March 1953, Finance Minister Schaffer, 12480.
88 Deutscher Bundestag, 259. Sitzung, 15 April 1953, Hammer (FDP), 12580. 
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of our young people; and we know our responsibility to maintain their bodily and spiritual 
strength, which they need particularly in today’s struggle for existence.89
Speakers constructed smoking and drinking as an emotional response to the trau-
ma of war, but also to the experiences of occupation, displacement and broken 
homes. As the occupational physiologist Otto Graf put it, “They [young people] 
have experienced people dying around them, in cellars and on the streets, and 
they cannot cope with these experiences”.90 A year previously, the director of the 
DHS, Hans Siedel, had made a similar argument, stating that young men had 
been socialised into smoking and drinking through their experiences as soldiers; 
but in addition that defeat and the occupation had led to social upheaval and 
feelings of inferiority. Siedel attributed smoking and drinking to a need to forget 
experiences which people couldn’t digest or cope with.91
 More specifi cally, in 1953, child psychologist, Werner Villinger (1887-1961), 
argued that part of the distress felt by young people stemmed from the changed 
circumstances of the German family, as men had fallen in the war, or langu-
ished in prisoner of war camps. Villinger blamed overstretched mothers, who 
were running households and going out to work, leaving children to fend for 
themselves; and disharmony between parents when fathers returned. But he also 
blamed the Americanisation of German culture, referring to what he called the 
nihilism of modern life, secularisation and the technologisation of society, citing 
the spiritual poisons of the cinema, the radio and magazines and mass sport – the 
last of these for the advertising at these events.92
 Villinger had been a prominent Nazi child psychologist, who allegedly com-
mitted suicide in 1960 after his involvement as an “expert” supervising the T 4 
“euthanasia” programme came to light.93 His words indicate the continuity of 
perceptions of smoking, and indeed drinking, and anti-modernist views, within 
broader youth welfare debates. Smoking was seen as one of a constellation of 
wayward behaviours, and much of the language was reminiscent of earlier de-
bates. In this conceptualisation, the problem of smoking could arguably be resol-
ved by re-instating a traditional family norm. Copies of the proceedings of the 
89 Opening speech by Stückrath. In: Schutz unser Jugend: 4. Kongreß für Alkohol- und Tabakfreie 
Jugenderziehung, 12-15 October 1953, proceedings published by the DHS. Bielefeld 1954, 8. 
90 Graf, Otto: Die Alkohol- und Tabakfrage im Lichte neuester wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse 
des Arztes. In: Schutz unser Jugend (1954), 22-31.
91 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1249, “Bericht über die ‘Wissenschaftliche Konferenz zur Er-
forschung der Suchtgefahren’”, 24 July 1952. 
92 Villinger, Werner: Psychologische und soziale Situation der Jugend. In: Deutsche Hauptstelle 
gegen die Suchtgefahren. In: Schutz unser Jugend (1954), 12-21. 
93 Peiffer, Jürgen: Phases in the post-war German reception of the “euthanasia” programme 
(1939-1945) involving the killing of the mentally disabled and its exploitation by neuroscien-
tists. In: Journal of the history of the neurosciences 15 (2006), 218.
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1953 conference were distributed to youth organisations and schools, showing 
that these ideas had some offi cial backing.94
 Thus, discourses on smoking after 1945 evolved in a new context but many 
of the voices were the same. One of the books often cited in the 1960s in writing 
on smoking was by Kurt Pohlisch (1893-1955) who occupied an ambiguous role 
in the Third Reich, but continued to work professionally and publish in post-war 
West Germany until his death. Appointed as Professor of Psychiatry and Neuro-
logy at the University of Bonn in 1934, one of Pohlisch’s main research interests 
was the misuse of alcohol, morphine and sleeping drugs. He appears to have 
been involved in the formulation and execution of the T4 euthanasia programme 
through 1940 and 1941, although he later argued that his stance had been inten-
ded to limit its impact.95 His 1954 publication, Tabak, developed his research 
interests in addiction. He considered the psychology of smoking among young 
people, seeing beginning smoking as a three stage process, starting with opportu-
nistic curiosity, developing through peer-led initiation into the last stage of esta-
blishing smoking as an imitation of adulthood.96 His approach to the psychology 
of youth smoking, whilst only part of his work, was to pre-fi gure later work on 
smoking in the late 1960s which also considered the psychological motivations 
of young people for smoking.97 However, whilst Pohlisch’s work was cited in 
the 1963 government publication Zum Problem des Rauchens, an interest in the 
psychology of smoking does not seem to have informed the government’s ap-
proach at that point.98 In addition, Pohlisch argued that the “atrocious social and 
emotional need of [the German] people” in the immediate post-war years led to 
young people taking up smoking at an earlier age and in greater numbers than in 
“well-ordered peace times”.99
 Similarly, Fritz Lickint continued to publish on smoking and health until his 
death in 1960 writing for both the DHS and the Deutsche Hygiene Museum, by 
then located in East Germany.100 Whilst Lickint appears to have embraced Hitler’s 
 94 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1250, report on “Wochenendlehrgang”, Hamburgische Lan-
desstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, 12 April 1954.
 95 Forsbach, Ralf: Die medizinische Fakultät der Universität Bonn im “Dritten Reich”. München 
2006, 200-201, 629-640.
 96 Pohlisch, Kurt: Tabak: Betrachtungen über Genuβ- und Rauschpharmaka. Stuttgart 1954, 
86-93.
 97 BA B310/520, Jugendliche und Rauchen – a study carried out by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für 
Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung, February 1969.
 98 Goetz, Hans J.: Zum Problem des Rauchens. Eine zusammenfassende Darstellung. Wies-
baden 1963. This was published by the Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen in con-
junction with the Aufklärungsdienst für Jugendschutz. 
 99 Pohlisch (1954), 93-94.
100 For example, Lickint, Fritz: Jugend und Tabak. Hamm 1958.
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Chancellorship in 1933, as director of the German Anti-Tobacco League, and had 
been a key speaker at anti-smoking events in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the 
line between anti-smoking arguments and Nazi sympathies was less than clearly 
drawn. As Davey-Smith and Egger have argued, Lickint was denied a post at the 
Scientifi c Institute for the Research into the Hazaards of Tobacco (wissenschaft-
liches Institut zur Erforschung der Tabakgefahren) in Jena because he had been a 
supporter of the Social Democratic Party.101 Lickint’s interests and profi le in anti-
smoking research and writing both pre-date and outlive the Third Reich.
 In the early 1950s, youth smoking was seen through the prism of the previ-
ous decades experiences of war, and subsequent social displacement. Tobacco 
use was addressed with alcohol use in the terminology of abstinence which had 
characterised earlier 20th century movements. In Hamburg, for example, pupils 
were encouraged to pledge to live an alcohol and tobacco free life in a so-called 
“Golden Book”, which is the same terminology used by the German Anti-To-
bacco League in the 1910s.102 But this was also grounded in awareness of the 
medical arguments against smoking – to take Hamburg again as an example, an 
exhibition in 1952 showed the connections between heavy tobacco use, cancer 
and heart disease. The specifi c risks to women were highlighted, with reference 
to miscarriage, situating the dangers of female smoking within a reproductive 
framework.103
 By the late 1950s, the emphasis in anti-smoking discussions shifted towards 
stressing the international scientifi c evidence against smoking, and towards de-
manding more restrictive measures on smoking in addition to health education. 
Such demands remained framed within the language of youth protection –re-
fl ecting the fact that the DHS saw the Youth Protection Law, enacted in 1951, as 
a means of pushing for restrictions on the sale and advertising of cigarettes.104 
In 1957, the national conference of the DHS stressed the need to protect the 
family, in particular children, from the dangers of alcohol and tobacco use. One 
suggested measure was a restriction on advertising for alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco.105 In 1958, an expert conference on the dangers of smoking, attended by 
101 Davey-Smith, George; Egger, Matthias: The fi rst reports on smoking and lung cancer – why 
are they consistently ignored? In: Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 83 (2005), 799-
800. The institute was founded in 1941, partly supported by Hitler’s personal funds.
102 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1250, report on “Wochenendlehrgang”, Hamburgische Lan-
desstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, 12 April 1954.
103 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1250, Von Suchtgefahren bedroht: Ausstellung warnt vor 
Alkohol und Tabakmißbrauch. In: Hamburger Echo, 22 July 1952. 
104 Poiger, Uta: Jazz, rock and rebels: Cold war politics and American culture in a divided Ger-
many. Berkeley 2000, 47.
105 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1250, Bundestagung der Deutschen Hauptstelle gegen die 
Suchtgefahren: Entschliessungen der Arbeitsgemeinschaften am 16 Oktober 1957.
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medical professionals, including Lickint and youth welfare workers, called for 
a reduction in tobacco advertising, the removal of cigarette vending machines, 
more non-smoking carriages in trains, and more funding for anti-smoking cam-
paigns. Such demands were justifi ed by reference to the growing international 
body of evidence against smoking, a body which was seen to include work car-
ried out in Germany in earlier decades, but also with reference to research in the 
United States and Great Britain. Details of a congress on smoking and lung can-
cer in London were reported to the 1958 conference, which also suggests an awa-
reness and regard for international developments.106 Key here would have been 
the MRC report on smoking and health which was published in 1957 in London 
and led to some limited government action in Britain.107 The 1958 conference 
on smoking held by the DHS shows a shift towards smoking being addressed as 
a single issue, divorced from concerns about alcohol consumption. This should 
not be over-stated, however, as the DHS remained primarily concerned with the 
problems of alcoholism, as its publications, such as Infodienst, and the annual 
reports of Landesstellen attest.108
 Calls for restrictions on tobacco advertising were a response not only to in-
creased tobacco consumption, but to the greater visual presence of the cigarette 
in advertising and marketing terms. From the late 1950s onwards, both Ger-
man tobacco manufacturers and (mainly U.S.) multinationals had established 
the American-blend cigarette as the tobacco form of choice. This was increa-
singly accompanied by sophisticated and widespread advertising, which played 
heavily on West Germany’s place in the post-war international order. The fi rst, 
and most well-known, advertising of this type was for the brand Peter Stuy-
vesant, which ran in 1957 with the slogan “the aroma of the big, wide world” 
(Der Duft der groβen, weiten Welt), accompanied, for example, by images of 
air travel.109 Other brands used similar captions: Gelten cigarette adverts had the 
slogan “Tempo, Life, Activity – that is Germany” (Tempo, Leben, Aktivität – das 
ist Deutschland!) through the early 1960s with images of quintessentially Ame-
rican pursuits such as ten-pin bowling, as well as international trade and travel.110 
Thus, cigarette advertising sold a lifestyle which was connected to ideals of free-
dom and liberty. This was different from advertising of the early 1950s which 
106 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1250, internal report, Fachkonferenz zur Erforschung der Ta-
bakgefahren vom 23. bis 24. Oktober 1958 in Münster (Westf.). 
107 Berridge (2007), 34.
108 Infodienst, various copies held in the library of the Deutsche Hauptstelle für Suchtfragen, as 
it is now known, Hamm, and annual reports of the Hamburgische Landesstelle, Staatsarchiv 
Hamburg, 352-6/1252. 
109 Der Spiegel, 16 May 1962, back cover.
110 Der Spiegel, 27 June 1962, 2; Der Spiegel, 23 May 1962, 2; Der Spiegel, 6 June 1962, 2. 
Autorenbeleg
87From youth protection to individual responsibility
tended to concentrate on the attributes of the tobacco used in particular blends, 
for example, the provenance, fl avour and aroma.111 Lifestyle advertising also ac-
corded with the changing cultural and economic climate of West Germany, as 
levels of affl uence rose from the late 1950s onwards – no longer were people, 
including young people, only spending their disposable income on alcohol and 
tobacco, but on other consumer goods.112 Rather than being itself a luxury good, 
cigarettes fi tted within a lifestyle, the idea of which was internationally oriented.
Beyond youth protection? A new direction in health education on smoking
The early 1960s saw the start of a more active federal government role in pro-
viding information on smoking, which was infl uenced by international deve-
lopments, both in scientifi c terms and in relation to the cultural position of the 
cigarette, as outlined above. A key factor was the creation of a Federal Ministry 
of Health (Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen, hereafter BGM) in 1961, 
under Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt (1901-1986), and the re-organisation of the Deut-
sche Gesundheitsmuseum (DGM) in 1962 towards a more centrally organised, 
health education role. The DGM had been set up in 1949 as a registered soci-
ety, with the intention of establishing a comparable institute to the Deutsche 
Hygiene Museum, which, after the war, was in the Soviet zone. The DGM was 
part-fi nanced by the federal government with other fi nancial support coming 
from the city of Cologne, where it was based and where a previously existing 
Volkshygiene Museum had been destroyed in the war, and the Land North Rhine-
Westphalia.113 In 1952, the DGM was expanded to encompass the Central Insti-
tute for Health Education (Zentralinstitut für Gesundheitserziehung) to refl ect a 
broadening remit.
 As part of this wider remit, the DGM set up the Information Service for Youth 
Protection (Aufklärungsdienst für Jugendschutz) in 1954 in order to bring to-
gether health professionals from government bodies and teaching associations 
who had a shared interest in youth protection and care. The focus was on youth 
education, which the organisation believed would help equip young people to 
deal with the dangers facing “body and soul” and “to fi ght effectively against 
trash and dirt” (Schmutz and Schund). According to a history of the Information 
111 For example, adverts for Finas, Der Spiegel, 16 March 1955, 35; Gold Flake, Der Spiegel, 16 
March 1955, 5.
112 Stephens, Robert: Germans on drugs: the complications of modernisation in Hamburg. Ann 
Arbor 2007, 86-87.
113 BA B310/290, Entwurf eines weiteren Jahresberichts (1965) des Zentralinstituts für Gesund-
heitserziehung, 4.
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Service, the main organs for achieving these aims were two magazines aimed at 
children and young people – the fi rst, Gib Acht!, aimed at 10-16 year olds and 
a later publication, Mücke, aimed at under 10s. These were distributed through 
schools, and Gib Acht! developed an annual competition aimed at increasing 
awareness of issues concerning health and welfare.114
 The use of the term Schmutz und Schund echoes interwar campaigns to protect 
German youth from immoral and obscene literature, and other pastimes which 
were seen to threaten youth with a descent into waywardness and immorality.115 
This terminology had also been used by the DHS in its earlier work.116 But by 
1962, when the Aufklärungsdienst of the DGM proposed running their annual 
health competition on smoking, the infl uence of post-war international epidemi-
ological and scientifi c fi ndings on smoking and health was clear. This was partly 
because the recently established Health Ministry saw itself as a key player in 
developing health education in these terms. In September 1962, Schwarzhaupt 
wrote to the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs in the Länder that she 
had promised the Information Service for Youth Protection extra funds to co-
ver their anti-smoking campaign. Her correspondence was prompted by the fact 
that responsibility for education lies with the Länder, through the Ministers of 
Education and Cultural Affairs. These ministers met in the Kultusministerkonfe-
renz (hereafter KMK) to deal with matters of cross-federal signifi cance, with the 
aim of ensuring comparability across the Länder. While the KMK established a 
commitment to teaching health care in schools in 1953, this appears to have lain 
dormant until 1961, when they reaffi rmed their commitment to education about 
health.117 In her letter, Schwarzhaupt stated that this campaign would be run un-
der the patronage of her ministry. She also stated that the questionnaire for the 
competition would be put together by experts, including both pedagogues and 
doctors, and that the fi nal version would be forwarded to the Information Service 
for Youth Protection at the DGM, to be published in the November edition of Gib 
Acht!118 This was clearly a statement of intent for the Ministry to take a leading 
role in health education and to make it driven by expert medical and educational 
knowledge.
 However, that Schwarzhaupt found co-operation with the DGM refl ects the 
fact that the DGM itself was undergoing a change of leadership and focus. In 
114 BA B310/302, Aufgaben und Ziele des Aufklärungsdienstes für Jugendschutz, July 1961.
115 Stieg (1990), 22-56. 
116 Infodienst 1949, No. 3, 1.
117 BA B304/2039‚ “Zur Gesundheitserziehung in der Schule: Arbeitsmaterial für den Schul-
ausschuss der Kultusministerkonferenz”, 30 November 1965, 29.
118 BA B310/302, letter from Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen to Kultusminister/Senato-
ren der Länder, 1 September 1962. 
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1962, having lain empty for a year, the directorship of the DGM had been taken 
up by Wolfgang Fritsche, who wanted to shift the emphasis of the DGM from 
exhibitions to a comprehensive programme of health education through publi-
cations, seminars, conferences and public engagement.119 The city of Cologne 
and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia removed their fi nancial support in 1962 
and 1964 respectively, with the Federal Ministry of Health taking full control in 
1964.120 This suggests recognition that health education was increasingly beco-
ming a federal matter; a point also emphasised by Schwarzhaupt’s contact with 
the Ministers of Cultural Affairs and Education at a Land level.
 An important factor in both the increased emphasis on scientifi c understan-
dings of smoking and health and the desire to act at a federal level was the 1962 
Royal College of Physician’s (RCP) report, Smoking and Health, which had been 
published in London in March of that year. This report was produced by a nine-
strong medical committee and reviewed the evidence on smoking and health 
damage as well as the psychology of smoking.121 It was published to great media 
interest in Britain: with headlines focusing on the greater premature mortality of 
heavy smokers due to lung cancer. The widely circulated British newspaper, the 
Daily Mail, for example, reported that 33% of heavy smokers died before the 
age of 65.122 Following publication of the RCP report, Schwarzhaupt declared 
the need for a medical-scientifi c research committee to examine the extent to 
which lung cancer is caused by smoking. This committee was to be set up under 
the auspices of the Federal Health Offi ce (Bundesgesundheitsamt), which was 
the body responsible for recognising and assessing health risks in West Germa-
ny.123 Consequently, in April 1962, the Federal Health Offi ce set up a committee 
to consider the RCP report, and to decide whether there were particular recom-
mendations which could be made. After consideration of tobacco taxation and 
restrictions on advertising, particularly advertising that might appeal to young 
people, the committee suggested that any legislative measures must be supported 
by health education. Nonetheless, the Committee reported that the British expe-
rience showed that general health education campaigns were largely ineffective, 
and recommended that health education be targeted at those who neither smoked 
as yet, or did not smoke regularly – that is, young people. The aim of such cam-
119 BA B310/290, Entwurf eines weiteren Jahresberichts (1965) des Zentralinstituts für Gesund-
heitserziehung, 8. As yet I have no further biographical information on Fritsche.
120 BA B304/2039, Referat von Frau Bundesminister Schwarzhaupt gehalten bei der 105. 
Plenarsitzung der Kultusministerkonferenz, 17/18 December 1964, 5. 
121 Royal College of Physicians of London: Smoking and health. London 1962.
122 Daily Mail, 8 March 1962, front page. 
123 Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, Deutscher Bundestag, 4. Wahlperiode, 22. Sitzung, 22 March 1962, 
788.
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paigns, as with restrictions on advertising, was to reduce the appeal of smoking 
to youngsters, or, the report pragmatically noted, if they could not be complete-
ly kept from smoking, to draw out the beginning of their smoking careers.124 
The committee also recommended that such campaigns should be scientifi cally 
grounded and credible, and that they should be based on advertising psycholo-
gy. Nonetheless, the committee also cautioned that such campaigns could only 
succeed, given the wide disparity between the fi nancial means available to the 
government and that spent on tobacco advertising, if all those responsible for 
health education and policy stood behind anti-smoking campaigns with their full 
authority.125 The extent to which this happened, however, is questionable. The 
content of health education material only changed slowly across the decade. Fur-
ther, whilst the schools competition was the fi rst element of a more substantial 
government commitment to addressing the problem of youth smoking, the health 
education campaigns of the mid-1960s suffered from fi nancial setbacks and bu-
reaucratic haggling, which led to delays in publication of materials and lack of 
agreement over principle and purpose.
 In conceptualising health education on smoking, the DGM also had one eye 
on the British experience. They were aware of the British “THINK” campaign, 
which ran with the text – “Before you smoke – THINK – cigarettes cause lung 
cancer”.126 The British Ministry of Health at this point sought to emphasise and 
draw attention to the “basic facts” on smoking, and hoped to discourage smo-
king among young people.127 Similarly, the West German schools’ competition 
was aimed at young people, but the brochure which grew out of this was aimed 
in particular at school leavers and a wider non-school audience targeted through 
health insurers.128 The schools’ competition ran under the title “Who is right?” 
(Wer hat recht?), and focused on a range of scenarios designed to test pupils’ 
knowledge of the health risks of smoking. There was also a competition to de-
sign an anti-smoking poster. This competition was judged a success with 200 
000 copies of the magazine and 800 000 copies of the questionnaire being sent 
124 BA B310/302, Der Präsident des Bundesgesundheitsamtes to the Bundesminister für Ge-
sundheitswesen, 12 September 1962, 4.
125 BA B310/302, Der Präsident des Bundesgesundheitsamtes to the Bundesminister für Ge-
sundheitswesen, 12 September 1962, 7. Neither tobacco taxation nor advertising changed in 
the immediate aftermath of the Committee’s fi ndings. 
126 BA B310/302, News cutting about the “THINK” campaign, which notes that it was the fi rst 
offi cial British campaign against smoking.
127 National Archives, London, MH 151/18, Memo, 31 December 1962.
128 BA B310/12, Schulze-Rhonhof, Deutsches Gesundheitsmuseum, internal memo, 25 Novem-
ber 1964.
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out. 300 000 questionnaires were returned, and schools were given prizes of 
teaching materials, books and sports equipment.129
 The competition was quickly followed by a brochure produced by the DGM 
with the support of the BGM, entitled Zum Problem des Rauchens in 1963.130 
This booklet was developed out of the previous schools competition, and was 
again intended to be “scientifi cally grounded” for use in classrooms. The fo-
reword, written by Schwarzhaupt, stressed that non-smoking was a matter of 
individual responsibility for health. Schwarzhaupt explained that non-smokers 
would fi nd their principles affi rmed in the words and pictures contained. Smo-
kers, on the other hand, were asked to consider whether they could justify doing 
avoidable damage to their health. The justifi cation was a personal one – the issue 
was individual responsibility, not duty towards the population as a whole, nor a 
question of wider social, cultural or political matters.131 This contrasted sharply 
with material produced in the Third Reich under the National Socialist party, 
where health was constructed as a duty for racial hygiene, but also military and 
nationalist, reasons. It also contrasted – to an extent – with material produced 
earlier in the twentieth century, which also made arguments about national duty, 
and that of the 1950s which saw smoking as a response to social and economic 
trauma, rather than a matter of choice, and as damaging to the population as an 
entity. The expectation at this point was that people would respond in a rational 
manner to the scientifi c knowledge presented on smoking and health risks.
 The 1963 brochure Zum Problem des Rauchens sought to ground its message 
in Germany history. This was not recent German history, but images and verse 
from the 18th century dealing with smoking, including edicts banning smoking, 
and, on the very fi rst page, a poem in praise of tobacco dating from 1720. This 
may have been to give discussions about smoking a longer history and tradition 
than the propaganda of the Third Reich. These historical snippets sat alongside 
the medical scientifi c discourse, and more moralistic statements about over-in-
dulgence in tobacco.132 Interestingly, the booklet contained a diagram and texts 
discussing the effect of smoking on women’s reproductive function and upon 
nursing infants – both concerns which were almost entirely absent in British 
health education material at the time.133 This was arguably a legacy of National 
Socialist views on smoking and female reproduction, which formed a key feature 
of Nazi anti-smoking propaganda. Although the brochure was criticised in the 
129 BA B310/302, Report: Wettbewerb über das Rauchen: “Wer hat recht?”, Deutsches Gesund-
heitsmuseum, Köln 1964.
130 Goetz (1963).
131 Goetz (1963), 3. 
132 Goetz (1963). 
133 Elliot (2007), 145-147.
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press for its lack of attention to lung cancer and lack of graphic detail, it was jud-
ged a success by the BGM, and a second run of 1 million copies was printed.134
 The focus on schools here was explained by Schwarzhaupt in a letter to the 
chair of the KMK in March 1964, in which she again raised the issue of smoking. 
She specifi cally related the need to act on smoking to growing concern within 
West Germany following the “English and American reports”.135 This was a re-
ference to the already mentioned 1962 RCP report and to the 1964 U.S. Surgeon 
General’s report on smoking and health which provided a review of the risks 
of tobacco use, focusing mainly on cancerous, respiratory and cardiovascular 
diseases.136 It would appear that Schwarzhaupt’s intervention was a direct result 
of the 1964 U.S. report which had been published in January of that year and 
received substantial coverage in the West German press.137 Schwarzhaupt noted 
in her letter to the KMK that “there is daily much concern among the general 
public about how to limit cigarette smoking, particularly among young people”. 
She further explained that much was being done to educate young people on the 
dangers of smoking through existing voluntary organisations, but these groups 
continually came up against the fact that more could be done in schools. She 
referred to the image of many teachers smoking in schools and on study trips, 
which did more to infl uence children to smoke than to dissuade them from smo-
king, and to the fact that school pupils were allowed to smoke during breaks and 
in some cases, during exams.138 The KMK invited Schwarzhaupt to address them 
in a plenary meeting at the end of that year. Here, she stressed the importance 
of health education in schools, arguing that – after the family – school was the 
most important site for this. She emphasised the necessity of teacher training on 
health education matters and appropriate teaching aids.139 In her presentation, 
she focused on smoking, but also discussed the importance of sex education.
 Whilst thanking her for her willingness to meet with them, the president of 
the KMK replied that instruction on health and related problems relied on the 
input of parents.140 It is clear from a subsequent memo that the KMK felt that 
health education on smoking was already being addressed at a Länder level, 
with various measures in place across West Germany. Smoking in school, for 
134 BA B310/12, memo, 25 November 1964. 
135 BA 304/2039, Der Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen to the Vorsitzenden der Ständigen 
Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder, 26 March 1964.
136 Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service (1964).
137 Forschung: Rauchen. In: Der Spiegel, 22 January 1964, 60-71.
138 BA 304/2039, Der Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen to the Vorsitzenden der Ständigen 
Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder, 26 March 1964. 
139 BA B304/2039, Referat von Frau Bundesminister Dr E. Schwarzhaupt, 105. Plenarsitzung 
der KMK, 17/18 December 1964.
140 BA 304/3125, minutes, 105. Plenarsitzung der KMK, 17/18 December 1964.
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example, was forbidden in Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatinate, although anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that such prohibitions were either rescinded or ignored 
by the 1970s. Other states had passed resolutions on the need to educate young 
people on the dangers of nicotine – though it is notable that in some cases, na-
mely Schleswig-Holstein, these resolutions dated from the interwar period. The 
material used in classes, according to the KMK in 1964, came largely from non-
government organisations such as the DHS and religious organisations such as 
the Protestant Association for Youth Protection (Evangelischer Arbeitskreis für 
Jugendschutz) in Munich.141 This memo suggests that addressing smoking was 
somewhat patchy. It also prompts the question how supportive the KMK actually 
were of federal government initiatives.
 Schwarzhaupt also attempted to bring the question of smoking and health to 
popular awareness among adults. However, this was more problematic, largely 
because of the infl uence of the tobacco industry and the volume of its advertising 
spend. In 1963, at the same time as Zum Problem des Rauchens was published, 
short TV adverts, or “spots”, were commissioned by the BGM.142 These spots, 
considered novel at the time, featured an athlete expounding the virtues of non-
smoking, a pupil being told that smoking was detrimental to his learning and a 
woman being instructed on the importance of not smoking while pregnant, and 
were intended to address the general population. However, the screening of these 
advertisements ran into diffi culties, as the television channel concerned did not 
want to screen them alongside cigarette advertising, as tobacco manufacturers 
were paying an average of 300 DM per second. The BGM was legally prevented 
from paying for advertising time, according to a report in Stern, which meant that 
a solution had to be found to show the spots in interludes between programmes 
normally fi lled with music.143 Similar problems were faced by the Hamburgische 
Landesstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren which wanted to run an anti-smoking po-
ster campaign. Two advertising distribution fi rms in Hamburg refused to accept 
the campaign because they feared losing the cigarette industry as their customer, 
and argued that they could not hang anti-smoking posters alongside advertising 
for smoking. In the end, a third company accepted the campaign, and the “to-
bacco industry” (presumably Reemtsma in Hamburg) requested a copy for their 
own archives.144 Both these examples show the reluctance of the media to cause 
offence to the tobacco industry because of the amount of money spent on adver-
141 BA B304/2039, Zur Gesundheitserziehung in der Schule, 30 November 1965.
142 Staatssekretär Bargatzy, Deutscher Bundestag, 109. Sitzung, 24 January 1964, 5028-5029.
143 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1248, Glück bei den Mainzelmännchen. Die ungewöhnlichen 
Aufklärungsfi lme der Ministerin Schwarzhaupt. In: Der Stern, 18 August 1964.
144 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1251, Das Plakat, das keine Freude macht. In: Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 4 February 1964. 
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tising, a reluctance which arguably shaped health education campaigns on the 
risks of smoking in the later 1960s.
The mid-1960s: towards a focus on advertising
Much of the subsequent work at a federal level on creating and distributing health 
education material on smoking was carried out through the Deutsche Gesund-
heitsmuseum, and looking at this shows some of the tensions which arose. By the 
mid-1960s, there was also a change in the political and fi nancial climate which 
impacted on budgets for health education.145 In March 1963, the DGM were ap-
proached by a fi lm company, Brevis Film, who suggested turning Zum Problem 
des Rauchens into a short fi lm about smoking.146 Although staff from the DGM 
met with the fi lm company in 1963, concerns about fi nances seem to have slo-
wed the negotiations. The initial estimated cost had been 35 000 DM, the fi nal 
cost was 80 000 DM.147 The fi lm was contracted in 1965, under the title “Death 
Gives a Party” (Der Tod gibt eine Party), and continued to be dogged with fi nan-
cial problems, as disagreements over content led to scenes being re-edited.148 The 
protracted disagreement over funds suggests that the political desire to address 
the issue of smoking and health was not backed by adequate resources, a point 
explicable by the broader fi nancial crisis facing West Germany at the time. The 
acrimony about the fi lm’s fi nal content also shows some disagreement between 
the DGM and Brevis Film about what the fi lm was aiming to achieve, and tensi-
ons within the DGM itself.
 On one hand, the fi lm was designed to appeal to young people, by incorpo-
rating elements of the post-war cultural context, but on the other, it was quite 
traditional in its approach. The innovative aspect of the fi lm was its clear desire 
to appeal to young people, rather than seeing youth culture as a threat to social 
stability, as much earlier health education material had done. The title Der Tod 
gibt eine Party appeared on the screen from a revolving record, and the opening 
scene was a party in a bar. This was thought to be a scene which young people 
would relate to, but which would also typically give rise to smoking.149 This in-
145 Richardson, J. L.: West Germany since Adenauer: stresses and strains of the late 1960s. In: 
Australian journal of international affairs 24 (1970), No. 1, 51-60.
146 BA B310/19, Memo relating to a visit from Brevis Film, 19 March 1963. 
147 BA B310/19, Film contract, 19 May 1965. 
148 BA B310/19, Brevis Films to DGM, 25 August 1965. 
149 BA B310/19, memo on Aufklärungsfi lm zum Problem des Rauchens “Der Tod gibt eine 
Party”, Bundesministers für Gesundheitswesen, 6 August 1965. The fi lm has been analysed 
in more detail by Uta Schwarz. “Der Schmutzfi nk” und “Groβalarm bei Kundi”: Film und 
Gesundheitsaufklärung nach 1945. In:  Roeßiger, Susanne; Merk, Heidrun (eds.): Haupt-
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tention indicates the beginnings of a new approach to health education, moving 
away from the traditional manner of imparting health education information. 
However, following discussions between DGM and Brevis Film after a fi nal 
viewing of the fi lm in August 1966, this opening scene was cut short, because 
Fritsche felt it was too long. This view was also held by a representative from 
television channel ZDF, who watched the fi lm to comment on its suitability for 
television.150
 The rest of the fi lm was quite traditional in its approach, but even then, there 
were some reservations about how far the fi lm should go. The fi lm sought to 
arouse fear in viewers; showing the party host offering guests cigarettes, before 
the camera zoomed in on the lid of his cigarette case to reveal words which 
fi lled the screen – Nicotine: poison. The scene then cut to a demonstration of the 
effects of nicotine on a laboratory mouse (which promptly died), and the rest of 
the fi lm interspersed explanation of the negative health effects of smoking given 
in a classroom setting with images of when people might smoke. The message 
was simple and stark – cigarettes are poisonous and they will kill you. As the title 
suggests, the intent of the fi lm was to scare young people away from smoking 
– a point which was emphasised by Schwarzhaupt’s successor, Käte Strobel, in 
1967 when she stated that the fi lm was intended to have a shock effect.151 Howe-
ver, the fi lm was less shocking than it might have been: a scene featuring a leg 
amputation was shortened, as most of the staff at the DGM and the television 
representative from ZDF thought showing prolonged sawing through the bone 
was too “cruel” and would alienate viewers.152
 The more contentious editing requests from the DGM related to the scientifi c 
content of the fi lm, in other words, the medical facts about smoking which were 
imparted in the voiced-over text. One criticism at the viewing of the fi nal fi lm 
was that the scenes discussing smoking and cancer were not incisive enough; a 
criticism that Brevis Film refuted by pointing out that the script had been appro-
ved by the DGM and the BGM, as well as a whole range of medical experts. Bre-
vis Film absolved themselves of any responsibility for these particular scenes, 
saying that experts had insisted “the risk of cancer from smoking should not 
be given such prominence as it had not yet been proven that this risk actually 
existed to such an extent”. Brevis argued that they had made these views known 
sache gesund! Gesundheitsaufklärung zwischen Disziplinierung und Emanzipation. Marburg 
1998, 154-168.
150 BA B310/19, Bericht über mein Gespräch mit Herrn Dr. Engler bei der Brevis-Film, Köln, 11 
August 1966. 
151 Strobel, Deutscher Bundestag, 125. Sitzung, 12 October 1967, 6316.
152 BA B310/19, Bericht über mein Gespräch mit Herrn Dr. Engler bei der Brevis-Film, Köln, 11 
August 1966.
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to the DGM through Schulze-Rhonhof, the staff member charged with the super-
vision of the project. Schulze-Rhonhof had, according to Brevis, also discussed 
the question of cancer with specialists in the area.153
 Christel Schulze-Rhonhof was, according to records, the public relations of-
fi cer for the DGM, and there is nothing in the documents to suggest which spe-
cialists she had been in touch with as regards this fi lm. However, through the 
making of the previous brochure, Zum Problem des Rauchens, and a subsequent 
1967 brochure Was stimmt nun eigentlich? (What is actually true?), Schulze-
Rhonhof was in extensive correspondence and contact with a range of medical 
professionals, educators and scientifi c researchers, including Dr Helmut Schie-
velbein, a cardiologist who had close relations with the tobacco industry and 
published on the pharmacology and toxicology of nicotine, who she met three 
days prior to the screening of the fi lm. Schievelbein was recommended to Schul-
ze-Rhonhof by the Cancer Research Institute in Heidelberg (Krebsforschungs-
institut Heidelberg), as a well-respected expert in the fi eld.154 Further, Fritsche 
refers to Schievelbein’s approval of the fi lm.155 From the available documents, 
it is not clear who made the argument that the risks of lung cancer were not yet 
suffi ciently proven to be included in the fi lm.
 Schulze-Rhonhof’s range of correspondents shows the links between health 
education and the tobacco industry in the 1960s, and suggests relatively good re-
lations, despite growing health concerns.156 Schulze-Rhonhof also corresponded 
with the Scientifi c Research Offi ce of the Association of the Cigarette Industry 
(Wissenschaftliche Forschungsstelle of the Verband der Zigarettenindustrie), 
meeting with staff there in December 1966, three months after the contentious 
viewing of Der Tod gibt eine Party. By this point, she was collecting informa-
tion for Was stimmt nun eigentlich? This Scientifi c Research Offi ce was prima-
rily concerned with researching the carcinogenic substances in tobacco smoke. 
Schulze-Rhonhof’s report from this meeting suggests that she saw the research 
153 BA B310/19, Brevis Film to Fritsche, 25 August 1966.
154 BA B310/12, Schulze-Rhonhof, Christel: Bericht über meinen Besuch bei Herrn Doz. Dr. 
Schievelbein, 22 August 1966; http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2501159889-9891.html pro-
vides a selected list of Schievelbein’s publications. Accessed 30 March 2010.
155 BA B310/19, Stellungnahme zu dem Schreiben von Dr. Engler, Brevis Film GmbH vom 
25.8.1966, 30 August 1966. 
156 In 1979, Schievelbein wrote of his deep unease at the “witch hunt” which the developing 
global anti-smoking campaign was in danger of becoming, although he was a non-smoker 
and against smoking himself. He believed that progress could only be made through scien-
tifi c discussion in a medical context. For discussion of the relationship between the tobacco 
industry and West Germany government from the 1980s onwards, see Gilmore, Anna; McK-
ee, Martin: Tobacco control policy: the European dimension. In: Clinical medicine 2 (2002), 
335-342.
Autorenbeleg
97From youth protection to individual responsibility
arm of the tobacco industry as a useful partner who could provide information, 
although she is careful to assure colleagues of her impression that “we don’t 
need to fear any negative infl uence; rather, we can avoid any mistakes before 
publication”.157 This statement may be read in light of the previous discussions 
about lung cancer in relation to Der Tod gibt eine Party and shows a relatively 
unproblematic conceptualisation of relations with the tobacco industry.
 The fi lm Der Tod gibt eine Party was lent out to schools and youth orga-
nisations across West Germany, and also shown in November 1966 on one of 
the main German TV channels as part of a health programme. Thus, whilst the 
fi lm had been created with young people in mind, it also addressed a general 
TV audience. Its showing was followed by a fi ve minute interview by Schwarz-
haupt.158 Once again, Schwarzhaupt’s presence demonstrated a clear government 
presence in relation to health education on smoking, but the haggling over the 
cost of the fi lm was indicative of broader problems of fi nances which extended to 
subsequent projects, given the broader fi nancial crisis. The brochure Was stimmt 
nun eigentlich?, mentioned above, was mooted in 1964, after it emerged that 
Zum Problem des Rauchens could not be re-worked to create a brochure suitable 
for children below the fi nal school year, a decision partly infl uenced by com-
ments the DGM received about the brochure.159
 Nonetheless, the re-working of the brochure was almost abandoned in 1966 
when it appeared that the Central Institute for Health Education of the DGM was 
not given the money to take the project forward, a point which suggests that the 
additional ministerial funding, which had been available for the schools’ compe-
tition, was not on-going.160 The project was picked up by publishers who agreed 
to take it forward at their own risk in October 1966, with some fi nancial support 
from Baden-Württemberg which was keen to order several thousand copies of 
the brochure for use in their schools.161 However, problems arose when the BGM 
mistakenly advertised the brochure as free in October 1967, leaving a hole in 
the fi nances when the publishers received “a fl ood of orders”, and causing recri-
minations among DGM staff and the BGM about who had been responsible.162 
157 BA B310/12, Bericht über meinen Besuch bei der Wissenschaftlichen Forschungsstelle im 
Verband der Zigarettenindustrie, Hamburg, 6 December 1966.
158 BA B310/19, memo: Aufklärungsfi lm über Gefahren des Rauchens im II. Fernsehen.
159 BA B310/12, undated comments on the brochure “Zum Problem des Rauchens”, for exam-
ple, dismissed the brochure as “non-journalistic, […] too historical, […] confusing, […] too 
boring, and school-masterly in style and with imagery, which would only delight a historian”.
160 BA B310/15, Besuchsbericht, 26-27 October 1966.
161 BA B310/15, draft statement for the Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen from Bundeszen-
trale für Gesundheitliche Aufklärung, 15 November 1968.
162 BA B310/15, Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen to Bundeszentrale für Gesundheitli-
che Aufklärung, 25 September 1968.
Autorenbeleg
98 Rosemary Elliot
Although there was undoubtedly a good level of public interest in smoking and 
health, health education on this, as with other subjects, suffered from a restricted 
budget through the 1960s, a problem which was not resolved with the establish-
ment of the DGM’s 1967 successor, the Federal Offi ce for Health Education 
(Bundeszentrale für Gesundheitliche Aufklärung, hereafter BZgA).163
 Financial problems aside, the process of creating Was stimmt nun eigentlich? 
indicates a change in focus from the dangers of smoking and health towards 
considering how tobacco was marketed. This may have been infl uenced by on-
going debates around cigarette advertising at the time, and the BGM’s desire 
for restrictions on advertising, which resulted in a voluntary agreement with the 
tobacco industry to restrict marketing to young people.164 When Schulze-Rhon-
hof went to the Scientifi c Research Offi ce of the Association of the Cigarette 
Industry in 1966, she was looking for help to collect a wide range of material 
for the compilation of the brochure – namely, press cuttings on smoking for a 
photo-montage, literature on the smoking habits of young people, statistical ma-
terial on tobacco consumption, and the amount of money spent on smoking and 
other consumer goods by young people, advertising slogans from previous years, 
and images from advertising, the latter intended for a photomontage. While the 
meeting concluded with a scientifi c discussion of the dangers of cigarette smo-
king, Schulze-Rhonhof believed this was too specialised to be included in the 
text of the brochure.165 The brochure set glossy pictures, such as would be seen 
in advertising with seductive images of smokers at parties, in cars or outdoors, 
against the truth of the health risks of smoking, set out in the text. The aim was 
to make young people think about why they smoked and the disjuncture between 
portrayals of smoking in the media and the health risks of tobacco use, hence the 
title Was stimmt nun eigentlich? or What is actually true? This suggests the view 
that young people were motivated to smoke by cigarette advertising, an argu-
ment which agencies like the DHS had already begun to fl oat in the late 1950s. 
This view was to gain increasing credence in the BZgA in the early 1970s, in the 
163 BA B310/290, Projekt-Zusammenstellung, 27 October 1968.
164 Schwarzhaupt, Deutscher Bundestag, 196. Sitzung, 2 July 1965; see also correspondence in 
BA B102/278193 which indicated the problems surrounding implementing this agreement in 
terms of anti-trust laws, particularly Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen to Bundes-
ministerium für Wirtschaft, 14 February 1966.
165 BA B310/12, Bericht über meinen Besuch bei der Wissenschaftliche Forschungsstelle im 
Verband der Zigarettenindustrie, Hamburg, 6 December 1966.
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context of both health education and discussions about restrictions of tobacco 
advertising.166
 However, one of the main problems of the 1967 brochure, according to a stu-
dy conducted in October 1968 for the BZgA, was that young people identifi ed 
with the smokers in the pictures, making comments such as “that’s exactly the 
way it is”, and “it’s like that for me too”. The authors of the study concluded that
The fear of not being able to participate in common experiences, not being up-to date 
any longer, is at least as strong, if not stronger, than the fear of not being physically 
fi t any more.167
This sentence is telling: arguments about health and fi tness which had been the 
mainstay of anti-smoking material previously were simply not relevant to the 
generation of young people growing up in the cultural context of the 1960s, if 
they had ever been. Smoking cigarettes could no longer be portrayed as wayward 
when around 70% of the adult male population (50% at age 18) and 30% of the 
adult female population smoked (24% at age 18).168 The challenge facing the 
DGM’s 1967 successor, the BZgA, who commissioned the study which yielded 
these comments, was to move away from a didactic form of health education 
towards creating something which would be seen as relevant in the context of 
young people’s lives, and which would lead them to question the pro-smoking 
culture they were growing up in.
Conclusion
Thus, the 1960s can be seen as a transition period in the history of smoking 
policy in West Germany. Across the decade, there was a shift away from older 
youth protection arguments, which were grounded in the early 20th century hi-
story, towards a more liberal approach which placed emphasis on making young 
people, and indeed adults, aware of the scientifi c and epidemiological research 
on smoking and health. It was, Schwarzhaupt stressed in 1963, a matter of indivi-
dual choice whether or not to smoke. Nonetheless, there was a clear recognition 
at ministerial level that smoking was harmful to health and that the government 
had a responsibility to inform its citizens of the health risks involved. This re-
166 Feser, H.: Drogen unserer Zeit. In: Höch, Uwe; Birk, Regina (eds.): Durch die weite Welt 48. 
Band – Ein Jahrbuch für junge Leute. Stuttgart 1974, 326-333, especially 332-333.
167 BA B310/520, Jugendliche und Rauchen: a study carried out by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für 
Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung, February 1969.
168 Foley, Barbara; Lee, Peter: Estimation of sex-specifi c smoking statistics by standardized age 
groups and time periods, http://www.pnlee.co.uk/documents/refs/ISS2suppl1.pdf, 96-103. 
Accessed 30 March 2010. 
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cognition was shaped by international scientifi c developments, rather than na-
tional concerns – it is notable that both Schwarzhaupt’s intervention with the 
Information Service for Youth Protection in 1962 and with the KMK in 1964 
were motivated by the RCP and the US Surgeon General’s reports respectively. 
Further, the liberal approach in West Germany paralleled that taken in Britain at 
the time. However, while there was a commitment to health education, the struc-
tures for delivering this at the level of the Länder remained largely unchanged 
and there appears to have been limited fi nancial commitment beyond funding for 
the schools’ competition.
 On the surface, this liberal framework was in contrast to what had gone previ-
ously and here, the 1950s have to be seen on a continuum with previous decades. 
1945 did not mark a break with the past in terms of anti-smoking sentiment, but 
rather what one commentator has called “old wine in new bottles”.169 Concern 
about medical and moral damage to the Volk in the 1950s can be seen as the 
evolution of social and moral anxieties around smoking which had existed for 
decades previously, and which pre-dated the Nazi period. It was the German 
Anti-Tobacco League which saw the coming of Hitler as an opportunity to fur-
ther their aims, rather than (initially at least) the other way around, while leading 
fi gures in that organisation continued to be active after the Nazis had fallen. In 
very different cultural climates, smoking was seen as a part of a range of un-
desirable behaviours, and children were to be educated against it. During the 
National Socialist period, smoking was seen to undermine the fi tness of young 
people, and damage the future of the race; by the 1950s, it was seen as a reaction 
to emotional trauma and as a result of Americanisation. But here too, concerns 
about the cinema, absent fathers, and a lack of authority echoed comments aired 
in World War One. The connecting thread was the idea that youth smoking re-
presented, in different ways, a threat to the social and moral order. In the early 
1950s, the West German government did not dismiss the threat, but rather chose 
to distance themselves from addressing it. This distance was both a response to 
the experience of “past dictatorships”, but also a recognition of the importance 
of supporting the domestic tobacco industry in the face of international competi-
tion.
 By the 1960s, older youth protection arguments sounded out-dated and la-
cking in appeal (if that is, they had ever had any relevance for young people 
themselves). This was no more painfully obvious than in the criticism of the 
1963 brochure Zum Problem des Rauchens, which aimed to be scientifi cally 
grounded, but used a very traditional layout to impart the message and drew on 
169 Bühringer, Gerhard; Watzl, Hans: Zur Geschichte und Neugestaltung der Zeitschrift SUCHT: 
Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen? In: Sucht 49 (2003) 8-12.
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historical edicts for justifi cation. By 1965, health education on smoking sought 
to engage young people with cultural references which might appeal to them – in 
contrast to earlier anti-smoking discourses which saw youth culture as a moral 
threat. In the fi lm Der Tod gibt eine Party, this was only achieved to a limited 
extent: discussions over this fi lm reveal the tensions inherent in trying to appeal 
to young people, but at the same time raising awareness of a risky behaviour, 
which was an integral part of that youth culture. The brochure Was stimmt nun 
eigentlich? engaged directly with this problem, seeking to make readers aware 
of the disjuncture between what they were marketed and the product they con-
sumed. This approach saw advertising, as well as tobacco itself, as problema-
tic, and, as with previous post-war anti-smoking initiatives, can be understood 
as an attempt to address the dangers of smoking in a climate where there was 
little appetite for legislation on tobacco use. Here the infl uence was Americani-
sation epitomised by American-blend cigarettes and all their associated ideals 
of liberty and glamour, but also what this symbolised for young people, and 
the population in general, in terms of looking beyond West Germany’s borders. 
Young people were growing up in an international cultural context, rather than 
one focused on ideas of “Volk” and nation. Further, the domestic taxation policy, 
infl uenced by the needs of the tobacco industry, was also shaped with one eye on 
the changing tastes of the West German population, to make sure West German 
cigarette manufacturers remained competitive against international (particularly 
United States) brands. Thus, while post-war tobacco policy was shaped by what 
had gone before, in both the Third Reich and earlier decades, it also has to be 
seen within the international economic, cultural and scientifi c context 1950s and 
1960s.
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